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Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence
This paper considers the effect of status or relative income on work effort, combining experimental evidence
from a gift-exchange game with the analysis of multi-country ISSP survey data. We find a consistent negative
effect of others’ incomes on individual effort in both datasets. The individual’s rank in the income distribution
is a stronger determinant of effort than is others’ average income, suggesting that comparisons are more
ordinal than cardinal. In the experiment, effort is also affected by comparisons over time: those who received
higher income offers or enjoyed higher income rank in the past exert lower levels of effort for a given current
income and rank.
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EFFORT AND COMPARISON INCOME:  
EXPERIMENTAL AND SURVEY EVIDENCE
ANDREW E. CLARK, DAVID MASCLET, and MARIE CLAIRE VILLEVAL
The authors test the hypothesis that individual effort on the job depends both on 
one’s own income and on the individual’s position in the relevant income distribution. 
Combining experimental evidence from a gift-exchange game with multi-country ISSP 
survey data, they analyze the extent to which relative income affects an individual’s 
effort, finding that an individual’s rank in the income distribution more strongly de-
termines effort than does others’ average income, which suggests that comparisons are 
more ordinal than cardinal. Their experiment also reveals that comparisons over time 
affect effort: individuals who received higher income offers or enjoyed higher income 
rank in the past exerted lower levels of effort for a given current income and rank.
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 growing body of literature in econom- 
 ics is devoted to the role of social com-
parisons in explaining various phenomena, 
including financial market behavior, crimi-
nal activity, and subjective well being. One 
specific area of this literature has focused 
on income comparisons and labor market 
outcomes. For example, quits are negatively 
correlated with a reference wage given by 
the average wage in the firm for similar 
workers; women’s labor force participation 
is influenced by income comparisons; and 
rank in the local income distribution is a 
good predictor of migration. These behaviors 
mostly concern job choice. Little is known, 
however, about the impact of relative income 
on how hard employees actually work on the 
job, even though efficiency wage theories are 
built on the concept of income comparisons, 
and relative concerns are appealed to as an 
explanation of wage compression (Frank 
1984). 
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In this paper we attempt to fill this gap by 
analyzing the influence of income compari-
sons on effort using both experimental and 
survey data. We suggest that such income 
comparisons may explain why some of the 
empirical evidence on the wage–effort rela-
tionship is mixed. Though it is commonplace 
to assume that wages have incentive effects, 
or that higher wages make up for higher 
effort in a compensating differential set-up, 
higher wages are not always associated with 
greater effort in empirical work. This has 
variously been explained by a crowding-out 
effect of monetary rewards on intrinsic mo-
tivation (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997), 
supra-optimal motivation generating choking 
under pressure (Ariely et al. 2009), or an 
earnings target that bounds effort at some 
threshold (Camerer et al. 1997). Here we test 
an alternative hypothesis—that individual 
effort depends on both one’s own income 
and the individual’s position in the relevant 
income distribution. In light of their com-
parisons with others, those who are paid 
relatively well work harder. We test whether 
others’ incomes matter, and ask, given one’s 
own income, which of relative income and 
income rank in the reference group is most 
important in determining effort. That is, are 
social comparisons cardinal or ordinal? We 
further ask whether income comparisons are 
not only horizontal (that is, comparable to 
other individuals at the same point in time) 
but also intertemporal, so that the time profile 
of individual income or rank helps to explain 
current effort at work.
Conclusive empirical proof of the exis-
tence of social comparisons is elusive since 
it is difficult to know to whom individuals 
compare themselves, and because indi-
viduals’ behavior may be correlated within 
a group—not because they compare to each 
other, but because they are exposed to com-
mon unobserved environmental factors, or 
because they share similar characteristics. 
The experimental approach adopted here 
has the double advantage of defining a 
priori the reference group and limiting any 
contextual effects. In addition, our approach 
relies on actual and costly decisions rather 
than on subjectively reported behavior. Un-
like experimental data, survey data offer the 
advantage of larger sample sizes and mitigate 
the criticism that laboratory experiments are 
to an extent unrealistic. The combined use 
of both survey and experimental data is still 
relatively recent (Fehr et al. 2003; Carpenter 
and Seki 2010; Brown et al. 2008) and can 
be interpreted as a joint test of robustness. 
If consistent patterns emerge in both types 
of data, we can be more confident in the ex-
ternal validity of our laboratory experiments.
Our experiment extends the standard gift-
exchange game between an employer and an 
employee by introducing income compari-
sons between employees from different firms. 
The reference group for employees consists of 
employees in other firms participating in the 
same experimental session. In this between-
firm comparison design, employees are pre-
sumed to be similar and are thus expected 
to receive the same equilibrium wage. In the 
first stage of this game, the employer offers a 
wage contract and in the second, employees 
who accept the contract decide on their effort 
level. In one treatment we can identify income 
comparisons as we inform employees, before 
they choose their effort level, about the wages 
offered by a sub-set of other employers in 
the labor market. Testing the robustness of 
our experimental results required a dataset 
with information on discretionary effort that 
closely resembled the experimental design. 
The survey data come from the 1997 wave 
of the ISSP (International Social Survey 
Program), which includes information on 
both earnings and self-reported discretionary 
effort. The questions asked in this survey are 
extraordinarily close to the context of the 
gift-exchange game, in that the employee’s 
reported effort is explicitly oriented towards 
improving the firm’s outcome.  
Literature
The existing literature on social com-
parisons can be broadly divided up into two 
strands: that on behavior and that on utility. 
This division can be illustrated by a direct 
utility function:
(1) Ui = U(ai, aj, …) for j≠1
in which individual i’s utility,Ui , depends on 
both her own actions and those of relevant 
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others, ai and aj. This utility function most 
often gives rise to a decision rule for i’s utility-
maximizing behavior a*i  as: 
(2) a*i = f(aj , …). 
The behavior and utility approaches to social 
interactions attempt to find empirical coun-
terparts to (2) and (1) respectively. There 
are a number of drawbacks to the behavioral 
approach, the first of which is that data on 
behavior are not always particularly accurate. 
Second, behavior often reflects the intersec-
tion of supply and demand, whereas we are 
interested here in individuals’ preferences. 
Third, under separability conditions,1 others’ 
behavior can affect one’s own utility, but not 
one’s behavior. There are equally problems 
with the utility approach, via equation (1). In 
particular, we do not necessarily know how 
to best measure individual utility, Ui.
Interactions in behavior have been widely 
modeled econometrically, despite the iden-
tification problems emphasized by Manski 
(1993).2 Many of these studies have concluded 
that social interactions do indeed influence 
behavior, in the sense that “if you do more 
of something, then I am likely to do more of 
it as well.” One interpretation of this maxim 
is that this correlation reflects a concern for 
status or relative standing. Another is that 
this correlation reflects the process by which 
individuals may be learning from each other 
about how pleasant or dangerous goods or 
activities are (so that their behaviors are cor-
related), rather than caring about their status. 
Rival explanations emphasize the potentially 
key role of common omitted variables such as 
contextual effects; however, much of what is 
published in the empirical literature is very 
careful to try to account for these. 
An alternative approach to identifying in-
teractions appeals to proxy measures of utility, 
such as life satisfaction, job satisfaction, and 
happiness (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark, 
Frijters, and Shields 2008). Perhaps because 
of a scarcity of surveys that measure both 
proxy utility and behavior adequately, most 
attention has been concentrated on the role 
of income comparisons in the utility func-
tion. Empirical estimation has thus mostly 
been based on the indirect utility function, 
Vi, testing specifications such as 
(3) Vi = V(yi, yj, …) for j ≠ i 
in which utility depends on one’s own and 
relevant others’ incomes, yi and yj  respectively, 
rather than its direct counterpart (1) above.
Both the behavior and utility approaches 
require that the reference group be identi-
fied—to whom does the individual compare? 
There are a number of potential candidates, 
including the individual’s peer group (those 
who share the same characteristics), others 
in the same household, spouse/partner, 
friends, neighbors, work colleagues, and 
the individual him- or herself in the past. An 
approach to modeling social comparisons 
which combines both of the above would be 
to consider i’s behavior, ai  as a function of 
both his or her own income and that of his 
or her reference group, yi and yj: 
(4) ai = a(yi, yj, …).  
This can be operationalized empirically as 
(5) ai  =  A0 + byi +  fyj + g'Xi + ei. 
The b coefficient in equation (5) shows the 
extent to which individual behavior, ai , de-
pends on the individual’s own income. If only 
one’s own income matters in explaining i’s 
behavior, then the estimate of f will be insig-
nificant. Alternatively, if income comparisons 
matter for behavior then both b and f will 
be significant. If action a is normal then we 
expect b > 0 and f < 0. This is the empirical 
approach that we take in this paper.
The behavior we consider here is effort 
expended at work. We ask whether workers’ 
effort, ei , depends on how much others earn, 
modeling
(6) ei = e(yi , y
*, …)  
where we expect e1 > 0 but  e2 < 0. Here y
* is 
some transformation of the income vector 
1Formally, 
 d 2Ui
  daidaj  
= 0.
2 Recent contributions in this vein have analyzed sav-
ing (Duflo and Saez 2002), tax evasion (Fortin, Lacroix, 
and Villeval 2007), labor supply (Aronsson, Blomquist, 
and Sacklén 1999), and students’ success at school 
(Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2005; Sacerdote 2001).
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of other people who are in individual i’s 
reference group. The idea is that individual 
i has a comparison or reference person or 
group j and reduces his or her own input or 
effort as reference income rises, given his or 
her own wage. 
Much of the efficiency wage literature is 
based on this idea of the comparison of one’s 
own wage to those of co-workers (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1990) or to that of workers in 
other firms (Summers 1988; Johansen and 
Strøm 2001).3 However, to the extent of our 
knowledge, empirical evidence that workers’ 
current effort does in fact depend on rela-
tive income or on one’s own past income 
remains slight.4 
A recent literature in experimental 
economics has sought evidence of social 
comparisons among co-workers. In the first 
stage of the game proposed by Charness and 
Kuhn (2007), a principal can offer different 
wages to his or her two employees. These 
employees may possess either homogeneous 
or heterogeneous ability levels, but they know 
neither the direction nor the magnitude of 
these differences. In the second stage of the 
game, employees choose their level of effort, 
and according to the treatment, wages are 
either public or private. Income comparisons 
are shown to affect employees’ behavior 
only weakly whereas firms reduce income 
differentials between co-workers for fear of 
low-effort retaliation from the lower-paid 
employee. In other words, firms anticipate a 
negative effect from income comparisons on 
effort that is not actually observed in workers’ 
behaviors. This wage compression effect was 
also found by Güth et al. (2001) in a game 
in which information about the contracts 
offered to each employee was manipulated. 
They demonstrated that principals tend to re-
duce the income differential between agents 
when contract information is made public. 
In these experiments, productivity differ-
ences are introduced between co-workers in 
order to motivate firms to vary their wage 
offers. The weak reaction by employees to 
subsequent income comparisons may show 
that workers consider productivity differences 
to be a fair source of income differentials. In 
our experiment, however, all employees ex-
hibit the same productivity, each firm employs 
only one worker, and income differences 
result from firms’ various choices (and not 
from any skill differences between workers). 
Gächter and Thoeni (2009) provided another 
experimental test using the strategy method. 
Subjects were asked to report their effort 
decision in reaction to various hypothetical 
income distributions. They identified a large 
subset of individuals who reduced their effort 
when faced with income inequality. In our 
experiment, incomes are actually chosen by 
real firm-subjects, and we infer the influence 
of income comparisons from individuals’ 
observed effort decisions. 
Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is based on the joint 
use of experimental data produced in the 
laboratory and on survey data. The survey 
data analysis helps to check the external valid-
ity of the experimental evidence. When we 
evoke income comparisons here, we define 
income as the wage offered by the employer 
to the employee; that is, we do not take into 
account the cost of effort that will depend on 
the level of effort chosen by the employee.
Experimental Design
The game. We identify the impact of in-
come comparisons on effort using a version 
of the standard gift-exchange game (Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 1993). Each session 
involves twenty subjects who are divided into 
two groups, ten in the role of firms and ten in 
3Wage comparisons and effort have also been evoked 
in the business-cycle literature (Collard and de la Croix 
2000).
4One fascinating exception is Mas (2006), who 
exploited a natural experiment to consider the rela-
tionship between relative wages and effort. New Jersey 
police unions bargain over wages with their municipal 
employer, with disputes being settled by an outside 
arbitrator. Controlling for the actual pay level awarded, 
Mas found that 12% more crimes per capita are solved 
(cleared) when unions win their case compared to when 
they lose. This is interpreted as evidence that police ef-
fort depends on pay relative to some reference point. By 
way of contrast, most of the experimental work on the 
impact of others’ income tests for inequality aversion 
and focuses on distribution decisions through choices 
over tax rates, transfers, or the distribution of income 
(see Cowell 2004).
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the role of employees. Roles are attributed at 
random and are kept constant throughout the 
session. All employees have the same charac-
teristics, in contrast to Güth et al. (2001) and 
Charness and Kuhn (2007). Workers do not 
differ in ability and thus do not have to form 
beliefs about the relationship between other 
employees’ productivity and their incomes. A 
Benchmark Treatment and an Information 
Treatment were implemented.
The Benchmark Treatment consists of the 
standard gift-exchange game. The use of this 
standard game ensures that our results can 
be directly compared to those from previous 
experiments before we introduce a new ele-
ment in the Information Treatment. In every 
period of the game, each firm is matched 
randomly with an employee. There are ten 
periods and each period consists of two stages. 
In the first stage, the firm offers a con-
tract consisting of a wage w ∈ [20, 120] to 
its employee. In the second stage, the em-
ployee decides whether to accept or reject 
the contract. If the contract is rejected, both 
the firm and the employee receive nothing. 
Upon acceptance, the employee must choose 
his or her level of effort, e  ∈ [0.1, 1].5 The 
greater the employee’s effort, the higher the 
firm’s profits; at the same time, the greater 
the effort cost c(e) borne by the employee. 
This effort cost is convex, as shown in Table 1.
In the standard gift-exchange game, the 
employer’s payoff is
 pp = (n – w)e 
where n is an exogenous redemption value; 
in our experiment, n = 120. This expression 
guarantees that the firm does not incur a loss 
even if the employee chooses the minimum 
level of effort. The employee’s payoff is
	 pA = w – c (e) – 20
with a fixed labor market participation cost 
of 20 (corresponding to travel costs, say).6 
These payoff functions are common knowl-
edge for all participants. At the end of the 
period, the firm is informed about the level 
of effort chosen by the employee, and both 
the firm and the employee are informed 
about their respective payoffs. In each new 
period, the pairs of firms and employees 
are randomly reshuffled. We implement a 
perfect stranger matching protocol in the 
sense that no agent is matched with any 
principal more than once, which, again, is 
common knowledge in that it is printed in 
the instructions. This allows us to rule out 
any reputation-building behavior (Gächter 
and Falk 2002).
The Information Treatment is similar in 
structure except that at the end of the first 
stage, after the firm’s income offer is revealed, 
the employee is told about the income offers 
that four other employees received from 
their firms in the same period. Employees 
can thus compare their own income to the 
income offered to other, ostensibly similar, 
employees on the labor market (but not co-
workers) before rejecting or accepting the 
5It is important to separate these two stages in order 
to respect the standard gift-exchange game and to check 
the comparability of our results in the Benchmark 
Treatment to those in previous work. As others have 
argued in the literature on gift-exchange games, this 
design allows us to disentangle the effort decision from 
the job entry decision and to analyze whether income 
comparisons exert the same influence, if any, on both 
decisions. Combining the decision to accept an offer and 
the choice of effort in one single stage would simplify 
the design, but this requires that the decision to accept 
a contract offer and effort choice be determined in the 
same way, or that rejecting a contract is equivalent to 
completely shirking one’s responsibilities on the job. As 
the results will show, we reject this hypothesis. In any 
case, there is no guarantee that an agent would choose 
to exert zero effort were he or she not allowed to reject 
a contract offer. 
6This fixed cost, which must be covered by firm’s 
wage offer, exists only to avoid having a minimum wage 
of zero in the set of firm’s actions; it has no implications 
for the theoretical predictions of the game. 
Table 1. The Cost of Effort in the Experiment 
Effort e 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6   0.7   0.8   0.9   1
Cost c(e)  0  1  2  4  6  8   10   12   15  18
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contract, and thus before choosing effort. We 
choose to display only partial information 
about other income offers (in each period, 
four other randomly-chosen income offers, 
instead of the whole distribution) to produce 
a greater variety of income distributions 
within the reference group. In addition, this 
procedure allows the relative income effect 
to be identified separately from any period 
effect. In contrast to the employee, the firm is 
not informed about the other firms’ income 
policies, reducing the likelihood that firms 
will behave differently in the two treatments. 
This decision is justified by the fact that we 
are mainly interested in the comparison 
between employees.
Equilibrium of the game. The equilibrium of 
this game with selfish and rational players is 
a minimum wage–minimum effort pair of 
decisions, [w = 20, e = 0.1]. The minimum 
wage contract should be accepted since the 
employee has no better alternative. Equally, 
the employee should accept the contract and 
choose the same (minimum) effort level in 
both treatments since the incomes offered 
by other firms do not enter into the standard 
individual utility function. Firms should thus 
offer the same (minimum) income in both 
treatments. It is possible, however, that in both 
treatments, income and effort will rise above 
their theoretically predicted levels. Existing 
research has demonstrated that employees 
typically reciprocate high income offers by 
choosing high effort levels that increase the 
firm’s payoff; conversely, they reciprocate 
low income offers by choosing low effort 
levels that decrease the firm’s payoff (Fehr, 
Gächter, and Kirchsteiger 1997).7 
In addition, information about the income 
distribution may affect effort in the Informa-
tion Treatment if individuals are sufficiently 
sensitive to income comparisons. If subjects 
make horizontal comparisons (that is, com-
pare themselves to other employees), we 
may expect effort to be positively correlated 
with both relative income and income rank. 
And yet, since firms in this game are never 
informed about the income distribution, 
there is no reason why their behavior should 
differ across treatments.8
Procedures. The experiment was conducted 
in the experimental laboratory at GATE, 
Lyon, France, using the Regate software 
(Zeiliger 2000). A total of 120 undergraduate 
students from three local Engineering and 
Business schools participated in one of the six 
sessions organized. Two of these concerned 
the Benchmark Treatment and four the In-
formation Treatment. No one participated 
in more than one session. Upon arrival, 
the subjects drew a label from an envelope, 
indicating the name of their computer. The 
instructions (see the Appendix) were dis-
tributed and read aloud. The subjects then 
filled out a questionnaire that allowed us to 
check their understanding of the rules of the 
game. Questions were answered in private.
The program paired firms and employees 
randomly and anonymously, and the subjects 
subsequently discovered their role (firm or 
employee). Since the game was repeated 
10 times under a perfect stranger matching 
protocol, each firm made an income offer to 
each of the employees. This yielded a total 
of 200 wage offers in the Benchmark Treat-
ment and 400 wage offers in the Information 
Treatment. Each employee made 10 contract-
acceptance decisions and, if the contract was 
accepted, chose an effort level. In the next 
section we analyze these effort decisions.
Each session lasted one hour on average, 
including the payment that was carried out 
in a separate room. The experiment was 
conducted in experimental currency units 
with 100 points equal to 4 Euros. Each subject 
earned on average €14 from the experiment, 
including a show-up fee of €4. This indicates 
that in each period, the subjects earned on 
average €1.
Compared with survey data, this experi-
mental approach presents many advantag-
7One might argue that individuals may also recipro-
cate higher income rank and higher relative income with 
higher effort in the Information Treatment. However, 
in our experiment, firms were never informed about 
the income distribution. As a consequence, ranking 
cannot be considered as intentional on the part of the 
employer. In any case, employees would presumably 
only reciprocate relative income if it were valuable to 
them, which is exactly what we want to demonstrate.
8A firm cannot know whether a lack of reciprocity 
is due to comparisons or to the employee’s selfishness.
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es—income is perfectly measured, effort is 
observed directly instead of being self-report-
ed, and the reference group is controlled. 
However, the artificiality of the laboratory 
may cast doubts on the external validity of 
the experimental results. For these reasons, 
we complement our experimental analysis 
with survey evidence on income and effort.
Survey Data on Work Effort
The survey data, multi-country and cross-
section, come from the 1997 Work Orienta-
tions module of the International Social 
Survey Programme, the ISSP (the data and 
documentation are freely available from 
http://www.issp.org). The key variables in 
our empirical analysis are effort, earnings, 
and hours of work. Income is measured as 
individual yearly labor market earnings, 
converted to U.S. dollars using Purchasing 
Power Parities from the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Hours of work are measured at 
the weekly level. 
The variable we wish to explain is effort at 
work, which is almost never observed directly 
in survey data. To compare our experimental 
evidence to (larger-scale) survey data, we 
require a survey in which employees report 
their willingness to exert effort in order to 
improve their employer’s outcome, as in the 
experimental set-up where the employee 
provides extra effort at his or her own cost 
in order to increase the employer’s earnings. 
The question we appeal to in the ISSP data is 
crafted to measure discretionary effort and 
is thus arguably well suited to our analysis. 
All those employed are asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with a number of 
statements. One of these is, “I am willing to 
work harder than I have to in order to help 
the firm or organization I work for to suc-
ceed.”9 This question is remarkably close to 
the context of the gift exchange game, in 
which any level of effort above the minimum 
is voluntary and increases the firm’s profit 
but decreases the employee’s payoff. It is 
reasonable to assume that “helping the firm 
to succeed” in the survey data is analogous 
to improving its payoff, and conversely that 
increasing the firm’s earnings in the experi-
ment is comparable to helping it to succeed.
The weighted distribution of the five pos-
sible responses to this question in the 1997 
ISSP is shown below in percentages.
 Strongly agree 16.7%
 Agree 42.4%
 Neither agree nor disagree 24.2%
 Disagree 12.0%
 Strongly disagree 4.5%
Keeping only full- or part-time employees 
aged 16–65 yields a sample of 12,000 observa-
tions over 17 countries (considering the two 
Germanies separately). Missing values on 
earnings, hours of work, and effort finally 
produce a regression sample of around 10,000 
observations.
We are interested in describing differ-
ences in the response to the effort question 
between individuals, and we first examine 
the cross-country pattern in discretionary 
effort. To do so, we allocate a value of 5 to 
“strongly agree” through to a value of 1 for 
“strongly disagree” to the question described 
above. Table 2 illustrates the number of 
observations and mean effort, ranked by 
country from the lowest to the highest aver-
age effort. The countries in our study vary in 
the degree of social reciprocity that workers 
exhibited. Workers in Mediterranean coun-
tries are ranked broadly towards the bottom 
whereas workers in Anglo-Saxon countries 
are on average more willing to work hard to 
help their firm or organization. Portugal is 
an exception to this general rule, appearing 
toward the top of the ranking.10
9This is similar to variables used in management 
to capture organizational commitment (see Jaworski 
and Kohli (1993)). It could also, of course, reflect the 
employee’s effort to prevent the firm going bankrupt; 
however, even in this context, employees provide costly 
effort in order to improve the firm’s outcome.
10There is a strong correlation between unemploy-
ment and the mean of this effort variable. The average 
OECD standardized unemployment rate in 1997 of the 
lowest seven countries in the ranking was 12.3%, opposed 
to 5.9% for the ten highest-ranked. Both the Pearson 
and Spearman correlations between mean effort and 
the unemployment rate are significant at higher than 
the 2% level. One interpretation is that social reciproc-
ity allows firms and employees to attain Pareto-superior 
employment outcomes.
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The main thrust of our paper is, con-
ditional on country, to see how workers’ 
discretionary effort is related to individual 
demographic and job characteristics. We are 
especially interested in the role of income on 
work effort. We control not only for individual 
income and hours of work but also for refer-
ence group income. This latter is defined in a 
similar way to that in the Leyden school—by 
calculating average values of income over 
fairly broad demographic groups11 —in this 
case country, gender, education, and age. 
There are three education groups (up to 10 
years of education, 11 to 13 years of educa-
tion, and more than 13 years of education), 
and three age groups (16–29, 30–44, and 
45–65). There are thus 17 (country) * 2 (sex) 
* 3 (education) * 3 (age) = 306 reference 
groups. These average income measures are 
called comparison income in the regression 
tables and correspond to y* in equation (6) 
above.12  Comparison income for individual i 
in cell j is calculated excluding i’s own income.
Results
Effort may be influenced by own income, 
by relative income or income rank, or by the 
income the individual received in the past 
if there are intertemporal comparisons. We 
estimate discretionary effort equations on 
both experimental and survey data to de-
termine whether income comparisons affect 
individual effort behavior. 
Effort and Comparisons to Others
The average wage offered by firms in 
the experiment was 53.51 (s.d 19.7) in the 
Benchmark Treatment and 53.09 (s.d. 20.0) 
in the Information Treatment (where wage 
offers were constrained to lie between 20 
and 120). Both average figures are clearly 
above the equilibrium wage of 20 (one-tailed 
t-test, p<.0001) but are not significantly dif-
ferent from each other. Firms do anticipate 
reciprocity from their employees, but they do 
not change their wage offers when income 
comparisons appear.
Two different specifications of comparison 
income are used, the first being normalized 
rank, defined as rank in cell or group/num-
ber of observations in cell or group, with 
a correction for ties. This is a measure of 
how the individual’s income is ranked rela-
tive to the other members of the reference 
group in the Information Treatment and in 
the ISSP survey data (and not relative to all 
individuals). In the experimental data, the 
rank determines the position of the subject 
relative to the four other group members for 
whom wage information was revealed. This 
measure is bounded between just over zero 
for the bottom-ranked income in the cell to 
one for the top-ranked income. The second 
comparison measure is average reference 
group income, excluding the individual’s 
own income. Average and individual earn-
ings levels are expressed in experimental 
Table 2. Mean Discretionary 
Effort by Country: ISSP 1997
 Employees Mean
Country interviewed  Effort
 No. %
USA 775 6.47 3.93
Canada 546 4.55 3.75
Portugal 843 7.03 3.71
Switzerland 1,727 14.41 3.65
Denmark 600 5.01 3.64
Great Britain 545 4.55 3.63
Japan 607 5.06 3.62
Hungary 626 5.22 3.60
Czech Republic 526 4.39 3.60
Norway 1,366 11.40 3.59
East Germany 261 2.18 3.59
West Germany 648 5.41 3.52
Sweden 793 6.62 3.42
Spain 387 3.23 3.35
Poland 564 4.71 3.26
Italy 475 3.96 2.96
France 698 5.82 2.85
Total 11,987 100.00 3.55
Note: The question is “I am willing to work harder than 
I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work for to 
succeed?” with responses coded from 5 for “strongly agree” 
through to 1 for “strongly disagree.”
11See for example van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van 
de Geer (1985). 
12This cell-average approach does not suffer from the 
identification problems that occur when y*  is predicted 
in a regression framework since the cell-average income is 
not a linear function of the X variables (the variables that 
define the cells—country, age, gender and education).
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currency units in the experimental data, 
and in thousands of U.S. dollars per month 
in the ISSP data. 
We estimate the influence of income com-
parisons on effort in the experimental data 
via random effects tobits. The use of tobit 
models is justified by the number of left-
censored observations in the sample. Table 
3 displays the distribution of effort levels and 
mean income per effort level, illustrating that 
minimum effort (0.1) was chosen 98 times 
out of 180 in accepted contracts (54.4%) in 
the Benchmark Treatment, and 214 times 
out of 378 in accepted contracts (56.6%) in 
the Information Treatment.13 Not taking this 
data censoring into account would likely bias 
the coefficients.
Table 3 indicates a positive relationship 
between income and effort in both experi-
mental treatments, which is typically observed 
in the gift-exchange game (Fehr, Gächter, 
and Kirchsteiger 1997) and is consistent 
with social motivations leading to reciproc-
ity. Though the income–effort relationship 
looks somewhat steeper in the Information 
Treatment, the joint presence of income and 
comparison income makes such bivariate 
conclusions untrustworthy. The main effort 
regression results using the experimental 
data are shown in Table 4, and those based 
on the ISSP survey data are illustrated in 
Table 5. Table 4 consists of two panels. The 
left panel displays the results of six regres-
sions in which the dependent variable is 
the effort choice of subjects who accepted 
a contract offer. The right panel, which we 
will discuss below, presents the results of 
alternative specifications that check the ro-
bustness of the results. Most regressions are 
estimated as tobits, which account for both 
left- and right-censoring (the first of which 
is endemic in our data). In addition, since 
each subject is observed a number of times 
(up to 10 times if the subject accepts all the 
contract offers), we appeal to panel data 
methods and estimate all of the regressions 
in the left-hand panel with random effects. In 
the Benchmark (Information) Treatment, 20 
(22) contracts were rejected. Our left-hand 
panel sample thus consists of 180 effort deci-
sions in the Benchmark Treatment and 378 
in the Information Treatment.
Regressions (1) and (3) consider the role 
of one’s own income in the Benchmark and 
Information Treatments, respectively. Regres-
sions (2) and (4) add normalized income 
rank as an explanatory variable: Higher values 
of this rank variable correspond to higher 
positions in the reference group income 
distribution. Since subjects are not informed 
about their income rank in the Benchmark 
Treatment, this “placebo” variable should 
be insignificant there, unless income and 
rank are strongly collinear. The last two re-
gressions in the left-hand panel refer to the 
Information Treatment only. Regression (5) 
Table 3.  Average Income and Effort Levels in Accepted Contracts
Effort level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Total
Benchmark
 Number obs.  98 22 16 12 11 9 4 5 2 1 180
 (%) (54) (12) (9) (7) (6) (5) (2) (3) (1) (1) (100)
 Mean income 50.9 50.1 61.5 64.1 69.7 71.1 71.3 80.0 95.0 60.0 53.5
Information
 Number obs. 214 45 32 29 13 18 13 8 0 6 378 
 (%) (57) (12) (8) (8) (3) (5) (3) (2) (0) (2) (100)
 Mean income 44.4 59.2 65.4 64.0 69.6 75.6 80.8 79.4 0 93.3 53.1
13If we consider individuals instead of decisions, we 
observe that only a minority of subjects behave self-
ishly. Defining as selfish individuals those subjects who 
choose the minimum effort in at least 8 periods out of 
10, 35% of the people in the Benchmark and 27.5% in 
the Information Treatment are considered selfish. We 
cannot, however, determine whether this difference is 
inherent in the nature of the subjects involved in the 
two treatments or if it is attributable to the dissemination 
of income information. If it is the latter, some fraction 
of minimum effort decisions are motivated by social 
comparisons rather than by selfishness. 
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replaces income rank by average reference 
group earnings (excluding own income), and 
regression (6) includes both income rank 
and average group earnings. All of the ex-
perimental effort regressions control for both 
gender and number of post-baccalaureate 
years of education.
Table 5 reports the results of four analo-
gous estimations on the ISSP survey data, 
in which the dependent variable represents 
the degree of willingness of workers to work 
harder to help the company or organiza-
tion to succeed. Each individual is observed 
only once and we have 9,854 observations. 
Ordered probit regressions are estimated 
since the survey effort question allows five 
ordered responses. We follow the same logic 
as for the experimental data—regression (1) 
includes one’s own income only; regression 
(2) adds normalized income rank; regression 
(3) replaces rank by comparison income; and 
regression (4) estimates the joint influence 
of own income, rank and average reference 
group income. We also control for hours of 
work, age, gender, education and marital 
status, and we include country dummies. The 
standard errors in this Table are clustered at 
the reference group level.14 
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that 
effort is strongly correlated with one’s own 
absolute income at the 1% level in both 
treatments of the experimental data and in 
the survey data. Regressions (4) and (2) in 
Tables 4 and 5, respectively, illustrate the 
influence of others’ income. That is, nor-
malized income rank attracts a positive and 
significant coefficient conditional on one’s 
own income. For the same number of dol-
lars/experimental units earned, individuals 
are willing to work harder the higher their 
position is in the reference group income 
distribution. Unsurprisingly, normalized in-
come rank is insignificant in the Benchmark 
Treatment (see regression (2) in Table 4), 
where individuals are unaware of their rank. 
In the experiment (column 4), a rise in rank 
of one position (out of five) increases effort 
by 0.57 (= 0.20*2.87), which is equivalent to 
a wage increase of 6.52 for given rank. Com-
pared to average income per period (53.09), 
this latter represents a wage rise of 12.3%. 
The rank/income elasticity is thus 0.614 (= 
12.29/20). In the survey data, a 20% rank 
increase has the same effect on effort as an 
extra $623 per month, which is 33% of aver-
age income, yielding a rank/income elasticity 
of 1.6. This higher elasticity may reflect the 
wider distribution of income in the survey 
data, the fact that rank matters more “in real 
life,” or that rank is more important when 
reputation-building is possible. 
The experimental evidence thus points to 
income position within the reference group 
as being an important determinant of how 
much discretionary effort workers provide, 
over and above the actual income they receive, 
the latter of which has been the focus of the 
literature to date. This is confirmed by the 
survey data analysis.15 This, to our knowledge, 
is one of only a small number of empirical 
findings pointing to relative income and sta-
tus as a determinant of employees’ behavior.
In regressions (5) and (3) in Tables 4 and 5, 
respectively, average income in the reference 
group attracts a negative coefficient, which is 
significant only for the experimental data. If 
we include both normalized rank and refer-
ence earnings in the same regression (col-
umn 6 in Table 4 and column 4 in Table 5), 
this marginally significant effect disappears, 
whereas the coefficients associated with rank 
remain positive and significant. Our second 
key result is therefore that ordinal compari-
sons, as measured by normalized rank in the 
income distribution, are more powerful 
predictors of employee behavior than are 
cardinal comparisons, that is, from others’ 
earnings expressed in currency units.16 
14Income is entered in levels. Entering all of the cardi-
nal income variables as logs produces similar results but 
is not preferred by the data (the log likelihood is lower).
15The ISSP results are largely unchanged when we 
drop the 20% of observations that are found in reference 
groups with 30 observations or less, or if we use a less ag-
gregated reference group by dropping education or age.
16This result concurs with that in Brown et al. (2008), 
where income rank is shown to outperform average 
reference group income in three satisfaction equations 
(influence over the job, achievement, and supervisor’s 
respect). For the fourth dependent variable, satisfaction 
with pay, both rank and reference group income attract 
significant coefficients.
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Other	results	in	Table	4	show	that	in	the	
experimental	 data,	 gender	 and	 education	
have	a	marginally	significant	negative	effect	
on	effort	in	the	Benchmark	Treatment	but	
have	no	significant	impact	in	the	Information	
Treatment.	In	the	ISSP	data,	controlling	for	
rank	or	average	income,	effort	is	higher	for	
men,	the	married	and	the	higher-educated.	
The	 difference	 between	 the	 experimental	
and	the	ISSP	data	may	reflect	the	far	smaller	
variance	in	the	demographic	variables	in	the	
student	subject-pool	than	in	the	ISSP	data.	
Last,	the	estimates	on	the	country	dummies	
in	the	ISSP	regressions	(not	shown)	largely	
reproduce	the	effort	ranking	in	Table	2.
Robustness Checks
To	check	the	robustness	of	our	experimen-
tal	results,	we	have	considered	a	number	of	
alternative	specifications,	some	of	which	are	
reported	 in	 the	 right-hand	panel	 of	Table	
4.	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	we	only	report	
the	estimations	that	include	both	own	wage	
and	normalized	rank.	First,	columns	7	and	
8	reproduce	columns	4	and	6	yet	allow	for	a	
less	restrictive	form	of	correlation	between	
error	terms	at	the	individual	level	than	ran-
dom	effects.	The	estimation	method	here	is	
a	tobit	with	clustered	standard	errors	at	the	
individual	 level.	 Similar	 estimations	 with	
clustered	standard	errors	have	been	carried	
out	 for	 each	 of	 the	 previous	models.	 The	
primary	significance	of	these	regressions	is	
that	the	results	in	the	left-hand	panel	of	Table	
4	are	unaffected	by	this	clustering.	Cluster-
ing	increases	the	standard	errors,	but	both	
own	income	and	rank	remain	significant	in	
columns	7	and	8.
The	 main	 results	 reported	 above	 were	
based	only	on	those	subjects	who	accepted	
a	 contract	 (and	 consequently	 reported	 an	
effort	 level).	 Alternatively	 we	 can	 include	
those	who	rejected	the	contract,	imagining	
that	they	would	have	provided	zero	effort.	In	
this	case,	no	observations	are	excluded.	We	
thus	estimate	in	column	9	a	random	effects	
tobit	model	in	which	the	left-censoring	is	set	
at	effort	level	0	rather	than	0.1;	column	(10)	
shows	the	equivalent	estimates	from	random	
effects	GLS	estimation.	Both	regressions	use	
all	400	observations,	as	opposed	to	378	previ-
Table 5.		Effort,	Rank,	and	Comparison	Income	in	the	Survey	Data:	Ordered	Probits
	 Willingness to work harder for the firm to succeed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Own	Income	 0.052***	 0.035***	 0.054***	 0.039***
	 (0.011)		 (0.014)	 (0.011)	 (0.014)
Income	Rank	 	 0.109**	 	 0.096*
	 	 (0.055)	 	 (0.056)
Comparison	Income	 	 	 –0.039	 –0.020
	 	 	 (0.034)	 (0.035)
Hours	per	Week	 0.010***	 0.010***	 0.010***	 0.010***
	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)
Male	 0.056**	 0.070***	 0.080**	 0.080**
	 (0.026)	 (0.027)	 (0.032)	 (0.032)
Age	 0.001	 0.002	 0.002	 0.002
	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)
Married	 0.068**	 0.070***	 0.070***	 0.071***
	 (0.027)	 (0.027)	 (0.027)	 (0.027)
Years	of	Education	 0.009**	 0.010***	 0.012***	 0.011***
	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)
Country	dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes Yes
Number	of	obs.		 9854	 9854	 9854	 9854
Log-Likelihood	 –13441.2	 –13439.1	 –13440.3	 –13438.9
Notes:	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses.
*Statistically	significant	at	the	.10	level;	**at	the	.05	level;	***at	the	.01	level.	
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ously. We find that, controlling for absolute 
income, rank continues to exert a significant 
effect on effort. 
These regressions are based on the strong 
assumption that rank affects the decision to 
reject an offer and the choice to exert mini-
mum (but positive) effort to the same degree. 
To test this hypothesis, we next estimate a ran-
dom effects probit for the decision to accept 
an offer, with the same explanatory variables 
as previously discussed: The results appear in 
column 11. The probability of accepting an 
offer depends on the absolute wage offered 
but is not affected by income rank. A potential 
explanation is that contract acceptance is a 
blunt decision, whereas there is more latitude 
in effort choice. It is therefore important to 
respect the sequential structure in the gift-
exchange game, separating offer acceptance 
from the choice of effort. This also explains 
why treating offer rejection as the choice of 
zero effort reduces the significance of rank 
(from the 1% to the 5% level). 
Bearing this in mind, we proceed to an 
alternative two-step estimation procedure 
that respects the sequential nature of the 
game in order to correct for any selection 
bias from the exclusion of the observations 
corresponding to the rejected contracts. We 
first consider the random effects probit esti-
mated in column 11 as a selection equation, 
producing the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). We 
then explain effort, conditional on contract 
acceptance, corrected for selection bias via 
the introduction of the IMR as an explana-
tory variable. This second equation is esti-
mated as a random effects Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) with clustered standard errors 
in column 12, and as random effects tobit 
(which we prefer, given the importance of 
left-censoring) in column 13. Both specifica-
tions show that rank continues to affect effort 
(at the 5% significance level). The results 
from GLS estimation suggest that a rise in 
income rank of one place (for example 4th 
to 3rd), which corresponds to a rise in the 
rank variable of 0.2, will increase effort by 
two to three ticks on the ten-point (0.1 – 1) 
scale, as 0.2*1.235 = 0.25.
The robustness checks therefore all deliver 
the same conclusion: regardless of the form 
of the correlation between the error terms 
at the individual level (random effects or 
clustered), and regardless of the way in which 
contract rejection is treated, individual effort 
is sensitive to income rank.17
Effort and Comparison  
Income Across Groups
Our main results in Tables 4 and 5 con-
cern average effects over all individuals in 
the sample. However, we may suspect that 
certain groups react to relative income in 
different ways. In particular, based on recent 
experimental evidence on the impact of gen-
der on competition or social preferences, we 
consider whether the impact of rank on effort 
is different for men and women in both the 
experimental and the survey data. 
The experimental results in Table 4 include 
interactions between Male and both one’s 
own income and income rank. The estimated 
coefficients on these interactions are always 
insignificant, showing that men and women 
react to income similarly in determining their 
effort choice. Table 6 carries out the same 
type of analysis on the more heterogeneous 
ISSP survey sample, where a number of dif-
ferent scenarios can be tested. In addition to 
gender, we may consider a potential role for 
the environment in which wages and effort are 
decided, investigating interactions by union 
membership, sector (public vs. private), and 
managerial status. We have re-estimated the 
regressions in Table 5, allowing for interac-
tions between the income variables and these 
different groups. The estimated coefficients 
on the income terms and the interactions are 
shown in turn in Table 6.
First, as in the experimental data, there 
are no sharp differences between men and 
women. Income is more important for men, 
but the interactions with both income rank 
and comparison income and men are insig-
nificant. The second panel considers union 
status, and here differences do arise. Effort 
17We have also estimated models using the Chamber-
lain procedure (results available upon request). More 
specifically, we add X
–
i  (the average individual rank of 
the individual in all previous periods) to the random 
effects tobit model. Our results remain unchanged. 
Equally, GLS with fixed effects yields similar conclusions. 
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Table 6.  Effort, Rank and 
Comparison Income by Subgroups: ISSP Data 
 Willingness to work harder 
Variable for the firm to succeed (ISSP)
 Interactions by sex
Own Income 0.025 0.032**
 (0.018) (0.013)
Own Income*Men 0.016 0.039**
 (0.022) (0.019)
Income Rank 0.075
 (0.082)
Income Rank*Men 0.069  
 (0.100) 
Comparison Income  –0.015
  (0.046)
Comparison Income*Men  –0.041
  (0.039)
 Interactions by union
Own Income 0.035** 0.042*** 
 (0.015) (0.013)
Own Income*Union –0.014 0.041
 (0.022) (0.027)
Income Rank 0.044
 (0.066)
Income Rank*Union 0.257***  
 (0.094) 
Comparison Income  –0.014
  (0.038)
Comparison Income*Union  0.060
  (0.036)
 Interactions by private sector
Own Income –0.006 0.037*
 (0.024) (0.022)
Own Income*Private 0.087*** 0.061**
 (0.025) (0.030)
Income Rank 0.260**
 0.107
Income Rank*Private –0.185  
 (0.119) 
Comparison Income  –0.037
  (0.054)
Comparison Income*Private  0.012
  (0.045)
Table 6. Continued. 
 Willingness to work harder 
Variable for the firm to succeed (ISSP)
 Interactions by  
 managerial status
Own Income 0.041* 0.028
 (0.023) (0.020)
Own Income*Manager –0.015 0.041*
 (0.023) (0.024)
Income Rank –0.044
 (0.072)
Income Rank*Manager 0.285***  
 (0.111) 
Comparison Income  –0.003
  (0.041)
Comparison Income*Manager  –0.080**
  (0.037)
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Other control 
variables are the same as those in Tables 4 and 5 for 
the experimental and survey results, respectively. The 
experimental results come from random effect tobits 
and the survey results come from ordered probits with 
robust standard errors. 
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 
level; ***at the .01 level.
Continued
for non-union workers is related to one’s 
own income only, with no role for income 
comparisons. Effort for union workers is very 
sensitive to income rank, perhaps indicating 
the key role of wage fairness in union nego-
tiations. The third panel demonstrates that 
one’s own income is more strongly related 
to effort for private-sector workers, but that 
there are no significant interactions between 
private sector and income rank or compari-
son income. Last, the effort of workers in 
non-supervisory positions is only affected 
by their own income. Workers with manage-
rial responsibilities, however, are sensitive to 
income comparisons, particularly in terms of 
income rank.18
Effort and Comparisons Over Time
The results that we have so far discussed 
have concerned the relationship between oth-
ers’ income and the individual’s own effort. 
We now turn to comparisons to the income 
that the individual him- or herself received in 
the past. Broadly speaking, we theorize that 
past exposure to higher incomes may reduce 
the utility associated with current incomes 
18We are aware that the use of interactions in non-
linear models leads to problems with the interpretation 
of the coefficients (see Ai and Norton 2003). As a check, 
we also ran separate regressions by the different sub-
groups identified in Table 6. The comparison of the 
resulting coefficients on the income variables yielded 
the same qualitative conclusions. These results are 
available on request.
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and thus decrease the current level of effort. 
This hypothesis has been tested with measures 
of satisfaction in panel data (see Clark 1999; 
Weinzierl 2005) but, as far as we know, not 
with measures of behavior such as effort. 
Similarly, a separate body of literature has 
developed on time-inseparability in behaviors 
such as consumption and labor supply.  
One difficulty expressed in the existing 
research has been to ensure that ceteris paribus 
holds over the long time periods between 
waves of survey data. Experimental data are 
ideally suited to testing models of habitua-
tion since we impose the same environment 
over time, especially in the perfect-stranger 
framework where there is no role for repu-
tation building. We therefore investigate 
the role of previous income in determining 
current levels of effort by estimating random 
effects tobit models on just the experimental 
data. The dependent variable is the choice 
of effort conditional on contract acceptance. 
Our governing assumption is that higher past 
income will reduce current effort since past 
income acts as a benchmark. 
We pick up the effect of past income by 
including running maximum income and 
running minimum income as additional 
explanatory variables. We thus ask whether 
effort at time t depends on the highest (low-
est) income the individual had been offered 
up to and including time t. We carry out an 
analogous analysis with respect to rank to 
determine whether effort is influenced more 
by past income or by past income rank. This 
running maximum/minimum specification 
is inspired by the peak–end transformation, 
which has been used to model how a flow of 
pain is converted into a final global evalua-
tion (Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996).19 
The period dummies in this regression 
pick up the fact that the running minimum 
(maximum) mechanically weakly decreases 
(increases) over time and avoids any spurious 
correlation between both running minimum 
and maximum and the dependent variable. 
The usual demographic variables are also 
included. The results appear in Table 7. 
Table 7 illustrates that the past matters. 
For a given income and a given income rank, 
effort is significantly lower the higher the 
most generous income offer is in the past 
(regression (1)); likewise, lower effort cor-
responds to a higher income rank achieved 
in the past (regression (2)). In contrast to 
these figures, neither running minimum 
income nor running minimum rank influ-
ence the current level of effort. This sug-
gests that high past income and income 
rank are used as benchmarks with which to 
evaluate the current offer’s generosity and 
thus the degree of reciprocity. Regression 
(3) compares the influence of the two past 
income measures. The best past rank in the 
income distribution (significant at the 2% 
level) matters more than best past absolute 
income, which is itself borderline significant 
(12%). The insignificance of the interaction 
between gender and rank demonstrates that, 
as above, men and women react to rank in 
the same way.
Discussion and Conclusion
Evidence for the role of status or compari-
sons in determining behavior remains elusive. 
In this paper we have looked for effects of 
income comparisons on discretionary work 
effort in experimental data and have then 
compared the experimental findings to re-
sults from large-scale survey data. Below we 
discuss three key findings. 
First, effort at work depends on the indi-
vidual’s own income as well as on what oth-
ers earn, both in the experimental and in 
the survey data. Our results thus contribute 
to the still small body of literature showing 
that comparisons among workers affect 
behavior in terms of actual costly decisions 
and not just self-reported well being. We 
believe ours to be one of the first papers to 
combine experimental and survey data to 
document this. Second, income rank (that 
is, first, second, and so on, in the relevant 
distribution) is a better predictor of effort 
decisions than is average reference group 
income. As such, comparisons are ordinal 
rather than cardinal. Last, in the experimen-
19Data from period 1 are dropped as income (in-
come rank) and running maximum/minimum income 
(income rank) necessarily coincide in this period. The 
period dummies therefore refer to periods 3 to 10.
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tal data, the income profile over time matters 
in and of itself. Those who received higher 
income or higher income rank in the past 
exert less effort in the present, at a given 
current income and income rank. This result 
is potentially important for understanding, 
for example, the frequent failure of mergers. 
Whereas existing research has concentrated 
on the role of income, mergers may involve 
substantial changes in rank as well; we have 
demonstrated the latter to be a strong deter-
minant of motivation. 
There are a number of explanations of the 
rank sensitivity of effort. We have presented 
our results in terms of income comparisons 
and concern for status. Alternatively, effort 
choice may derive from inequality aversion 
(see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt 1999); 
that is, those who earn a high income in-
crease their effort so as to reduce the differ-
ence between their own earnings (income 
minus effort cost) and those of lower (and 
particularly the lowest) income workers. 
Though it is difficult to distinguish cleanly 
between theories, we note that inequality 
aversion would predict a stronger effort role 
for others’ incomes than for income rank, 
whereas in both experimental and survey 
data we find the opposite to be the case. 
Furthermore, inequality aversion does not 
clarify the role of past income and income 
rank in explaining current effort, whereas 
income comparisons do. 
Another way to interpret our results is to 
say that workers learn what the “fair income” 
is in the group. In this case, their effort does 
not depend on within-period comparisons 
as such but rather on the search for the 
norm. Workers learn progressively how their 
current firm’s behavior compares to that of 
other firms, which would also explain why 
past wages negatively affect current effort, 
everything else being equal. As such, our 
regressions might capture a comparison ef-
Table 7.  Effort and Past Income in the Experimental Information Treatment
Dependent variable  Effort Level in Accepted Contracts
Models RE Tobit (1)a RE Tobit (2) RE Tobit (3)
Income 0.106*** 0.098*** 0.107***
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Normalized Income Rank 2.368*** 3.034*** 2.844***
          (0.864) (0.868)        (0.896)
Running Minimum Income  – 0.009
          (0.015)  
Running Maximum Income – 0.022*  – 0.038
  (0.013)         (0.024)
Running Minimum Rank  0.639 
  (0.904) 
Running Maximum Rank   – 4.259***  – 3.396**
           (1.417) (1.453)
Demographic variables Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes
Session dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant        – 6.421*** – 5.296*** – 5.144***
       (1.171)      (1.307)       (1.308)
Observations 338 338 338
Left-Censored obs. 197  197 197
Right-Censored obs 5 5 5
Log-Likelihood –351.655 –349.642 –349.446
Wald χ2 332.93 352.34 349.72
p > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a RE Tobit=random error tobit. 
Other Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The demographic and session variables are the same as those in Table 4.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
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fect based on learning. Although the subjects 
likely do learn the average wage over time, 
we do not believe that this learning entirely 
replaces the rank effect, for a number of 
reasons. First, if we were observing learning 
in the experiment, employees should reject 
more offers over time as they learn what the 
fair income is, and they should reject more 
contracts in the Information Treatment 
than in the Benchmark Treatment. Neither 
of these predictions holds. Second, if only 
learning is present, income rank should 
be insignificant, or it should at least be less 
important than the reference income within 
the group. However, reference income in 
the experiment is less significant than rank 
is, and when we include both variables in 
the regression at the same time, only rank 
remains significant. In the survey data, refer-
ence income is never significant. Last, in the 
experiment, the employees should also care 
about both their own best and worst wages in 
the past, which is not the case. As such, we 
believe that an interpretation in terms of rank 
and status-seeking is the most consistent with 
all of our experimental and survey findings.
One general implication of our work is 
that combining experiments in a controlled 
environment and survey analysis, based on 
subjective data, serves as a validation exer-
cise. Although both approaches have been 
criticized for separate reasons, here they 
produce remarkably similar and consistent 
results about the importance of income rank 
on effort decisions. Another validation 
procedure would consist of asking the ex-
perimental subjects to perform a real effort 
task instead of picking numbers from a table 
and would constitute a natural extension 
of this paper.
More than 20 years ago, Bob Frank (1985) 
suggested that firms could exchange status 
for wages. In the context of between-firm 
comparisons, this paper has shown that 
these two are indeed substitutes in terms of 
inciting worker effort. Worker effort is lower 
in the face of both absolutely and relatively 
low incomes, where this relativity concerns 
both others in the same period and oneself 
in previous periods. This may explain why 
firms favor income secrecy and also why the 
same income at a point in time might pro-
duce different effort levels. The results also 
demonstrate the concrete advantage accruing 
to firms paying rising income profiles. More 
generally, income comparisons, both to oth-
ers and to oneself in the past, seem to be a 
pervasive element of economic life.
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Appendix 
Experimental Instructions in the Information Treatment
General Information
You are going to participate in an experiment on the 
labor market for the MiRE – Ministry of Social Affairs. 
If you read these instructions carefully, you can earn a 
considerable amount of money. The amount of your 
earnings depends not only on your decisions but also 
on the decisions of the other participants with whom 
you will interact. During this session, your earnings will 
be calculated in points, with 
100 points = 4 Euros.
At the end of the session, all the profits you have 
made in each period will be added up and converted 
into Euros. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee 
of 4 Euros. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash in 
a separate room in order to preserve confidentiality. 
At the beginning of the session, each of the 20 par-
ticipants will be assigned one of two roles: 10 participants 
will be “employees” and 10 participants will be “firms.” 
Your computer screen will inform you about your role. 
You will keep the same role throughout the session. You 
will never be informed of the identity of the participants 
you will interact with. 
The labor market consists of 10 periods.
Decision-Making in each Period
Each period consists of two stages. In the first stage, 
each firm is paired randomly and anonymously with 
an employee. Each firm makes an income offer to its 
employee. The employee is informed of the income 
offer made by the firm and is also informed of the 
income offers made by 4 other firms randomly chosen 
in the room. 
The employee can agree to work for the income 
offered by the firm or not to accept the firm’s offer. If 
the employee accepts the offer, he or she proceeds to 
the second stage.
In the second stage, the employees who have accepted 
an offer must decide on their quantity of work. The 
details of the procedure are explained below.
Please note that in each new period, firm-employee 
pairs are reshuffled. You are sure not to interact more 
than once with the same firm or with the same employee 
if you are a firm.
Information about the Labor Market in each Period
At the beginning of the period, the firm makes an 
offer to the employee. This income ranges between 20 
and 120 points. Information about this income offer 
will be communicated to 4 other employees. 
The employee is informed about both the income 
offer made by his or her firm and the income offers 
made by 4 other firms to their employees. These firms 
are chosen randomly.
The employee can accept the offer from the firm 
and work, or reject the offer and, in this case, not 
work: in the latter case both the employee and the firm 
earn nothing for the current period. Only the firm is 
informed about the acceptance or the rejection of the 
offer by the employee.
If the employee has accepted the income offer, he or 
she receives the income and must decide on the quantity 
of work. The firm is informed about this quantity of 
work but neither other firms nor other employees are 
informed about it. The employee must bear a transporta-
tion cost of 20 points.
How are Payoffs in each Period Determined?
The Employee’s Payoff
If the employee has rejected the firm’s offer, the 
payoff is zero for the period.
If the employee has accepted the firm’s offer, the 
employee receives an income. He or she must subtract 
from this income both a transportation cost of 20 points 
and the cost associated with the quantity of work he or 
she has chosen.
The employee determines the quantity of work in 
choosing a number in between .1 and 1, as indicated in 
the table below. The smallest quantity of work is .1 and the 
largest is 1. The higher the number chosen, the greater 
the quantity of work, and the higher the firm’s payoff.
The greater the quantity of work chosen, the higher 
is the associated cost to the employee. The table below 
shows how costs vary with the quantity of work.
In the case that the income offer is accepted, the 
employee’s payoff in points is determined as follows:
Employee’s Payoff in Points in each Period =
Income – Cost of the Quantity of Work – Transpor-
tation Cost
Transportation cost = 20 points
Relationship between the quantity of work and the 
associated cost
Quantity  
  of work  1  .2  .3  .4  .5  .6   .7   .8   .9   1
Associated  
  cost 0 1 2  4  6  8 10 12 15 18
The Employer’s Payoff
At the beginning of each period, the firm receives 
120 coupons from the experimenter that can be used to 
pay the income of the current period. If the firm offers 
an income of 120 points to its employee and if this offer 
is accepted, then the firm has no coupons left. If the 
firm offers an income of 20 points to its employee and 
if this employee accepts this offer, then the firm retains 
100 coupons. More generally, the firm keeps 
120 coupons – the income paid to the employee.
How are the remaining coupons converted into 
points? The number of coupons kept by the firm is mul-
tiplied by the quantity of work chosen by the employee. 
The result indicates the firm’s payoff in points for the 
current period. Then,
Firm’s payoff in points in each period = 
(number of coupons – income) * quantity of work
If the employee does not accept the firm’s offer, 
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